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The production to which the protection of copyright may be accorded is 
the property of the author and not of the United States.  But the copyright 
is the creature of the federal statute passed in the exercise of the power 
vested in the Congress.  And this court has repeatedly said, the Congress 
did not sanction an existing right, but created a new one.1 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
[1]  In the current digital millennium, intellectual property law is 
constantly besieged by new technologies, threatening various patent, 
trademark, and copyright protections.  Though intellectual property law 
shields individual rights on the one hand, on the other hand the 
overarching purpose of this protection was not to espouse a regime of 
private ownership, but to imbue the Founders’ intent within a legal 
framework by “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,” 
through “secur[ing] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
                                                 
*
 University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law, J.D. and M.B.A. candidate 
2009.  The author would like to thank Jennifer Jones and Eileen Geller of the Richmond 
Journal of Law and Technology for their patience and assistance during the publication 
process.  Additionally, Professors Chris Cotropia and James Gibson provided invaluable 
thoughts and suggestions during the editing of this article, and the author would like to 
thank them for their time and assistance. 
1
 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (emphasis added). 
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”2  The grant 
of a copyright was merely a means to serve the general public’s end, with 
that end being the dissemination of ideas and inventions to an increasingly 
sophisticated populace.  The supposition was that giving an author 
exclusive rights provided an incentive for his or her further contribution to 
the arts and sciences within the public domain.  Ironically, this exclusive 
endowment of a right both restricts and expands the availability of these 
new ideas to the general public, by inhibiting the availability of certain 
works to the public (by giving an author exclusive rights) in order to 
incentivize the authors to produce additional creative works.  
Understandably, such a system begot a pair of warring brothers in 
Authorial Rights and the Public Good, two nemeses constantly vying for 
absolute authority, yet only one competitor has the Constitution on its 
side.  Although Authorial Rights may not like it, the Public Good is the 
true theory upon which the intellectual property rights were founded. 
 
[2]  The jurisprudence predating and following the case eBay v. 
MercExchange personifies such a struggle.  eBay v. MercExchange 
involved the infringement of a patent, however the conclusion handed 
down by the Supreme Court contained significant repercussions for 
copyright law.3  In eBay, the United States Supreme Court examined one 
of patent law’s most formidable weapons, the permanent injunction, and 
extended its application to copyright lawsuits.4  The Supreme Court’s 
general advice pointed lower courts towards a case-by-case analysis in 
determining whether or not a permanent injunction should be granted in 
both patent and copyright cases.5  The overarching, yet unspoken, policy 
argument behind this decision was to dissuade “licensing fee holdups” by 
nefarious “patent trolls.”6  Patent trolls are individuals and businesses 
                                                 
2
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3
 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006); see generally 
Thomas L. Casagrande, The Reach of eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.: Not Just For 
Trolls and Patents, HOUS. LAW., Dec. 2006, at 10, 11 (discussing the broader 
implications of the eBay decision across the intellectual property field). 
4
 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.   
5
 See generally John H. Barr, Jr. & Jeffrey I. Wasserman, Controlling Patent Trolls: eBay 
Decision Limits Strategic Advantages for Businesses That Own and License Merely for 
Fees, 237 N.Y. L. J., Apr. 23, 2007, at S6 (stating that the lesson learned from the eBay 
case was that “[patent and copyright] cases should be decided on a case-by-case basis.”). 
6
 A “patent troll” is a term used to describe people who “try to make a lot of money off a 
patent they are not using and have no intention of using.” Barr & Wasserman, supra note 
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which utilize the permanent injunction as a “bargaining tool to charge 
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the 
patent.”7   
 
[3]  The eBay decision significantly overturned the Federal Circuit’s trend 
in granting near-automatic injunctive relief in patent infringement cases,8 
yet did not seem to have much of a general effect on the actions of other 
courts, which were already following equitable principles.  Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in the eBay case enunciated the situation the court 
sought to avoid in articulating the rule that patent cases—like all other 
types of cases—should employ a proper analysis of the traditional four-
factor test in determining whether or not an injunction is necessary.9  The 
majority opinion ended the Federal Circuit’s habit of treating patent cases 
as “special exceptions” to the traditional standard involved in awarding 
injunctions.10  The Court cited Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo as the case 
which properly identified those four factors used to determine an award of 
injunctive relief: 
 
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interested would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction.11 
 
Under a proper construction of these traditional equitable principles, 
courts must apply their own discretionary judgment in determining 
whether or not an injunction is appropriate in both patent and copyright 
law contexts.12  Though, at first glance, eBay might sound an alarm 
                                                                                                                         
5, at S6 (quoting Peter Detkin in Brenda Sandburg, A Modest Proposal, RECORDER, May 
5, 2005, at 1). 
7
 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842. 
8
 Id. at 1839. 
9
 Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
10
 Id. at 1840. 
11
 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006) (citing Weinberger 
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982)). 
12
 Id. at 1841. 
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heralding the unavailability of permanent injunctive relief, eBay’s future 
policy implications do not disrupt current equitable practices in copyright 
law as much as one may think. 
A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
 
[4]  This note contains four parts.  The first part entails an analysis of the 
historical background pre-dating the eBay decision, and a description of 
how case law in the copyright context provided the backdrop for the 
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay.   This section also showcases several 
different scenarios encountered in the context of considering an injunction 
within a copyright case.  The second part explains the facts of eBay, and 
the respective goals of the majority and concurring opinions.  The third 
section discusses several cases in copyright and patent law since the eBay 
decision, and what future implications these rulings might have on 
copyright and patent law in the digital age. Finally, the fourth part 
concludes with thoughts on the possible impact the eBay decision might 
have in the future, and what the eBay holding could mean in various 
circumstances. 
 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
1. DEFINITION OF AN INJUNCTION 
 
[5]  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, an injunction is “a court order 
commanding or preventing an action.”13  To acquire an injunction, a 
plaintiff must “show that there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy 
at law and that an irreparable injury will result unless the relief is 
granted.”14  A permanent injunction may be granted by a judge in certain 
cases after a hearing on the merits, but permanent injunctions need not 
always last “forever.”15  Under the Patent Act, a court “may” issue an 
injunction “in accordance with principles of equity.”16  Likewise in 
copyright cases, the Copyright Act provides that a “court ‘may’ grant 
injunctive relief ‘on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or 
                                                 
13
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).   
14
 Id.  
15
 Id.  
16
 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952). 
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restrain infringement of a copyright.’”17  In constructing this purposive 
language, Congress ensured the discretionary power of courts in making 
the decision of whether to grant or deny an injunction.18   
 
2. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND PRECEDENTS INVOLVING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
 
[6]  The Supreme Court in eBay relied on several of its own precedents in 
reaching the conclusion that courts should exercise discretion on a case-
by-case basis in determining whether or not injunctive relief is appropriate 
in patent and copyright cases.19  The Supreme Court based its holding in 
eBay on general principles of equity in overruling the Federal Circuit’s 
previous determination that infringement merits almost inevitable 
permanent injunctive relief.20  The Weinberger case paved the way for this 
finding. 
 
[7]  In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,21 the Supreme Court developed the 
four-part test for determining whether or not a court should issue an 
injunction in any type of case.  The factors which a plaintiff must 
demonstrate are:  
 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interested would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.22 
 
Weinberger involved an injunction to enjoin the U.S. Navy from using a 
portion of land for training purposes.  Though on a completely different 
                                                 
17
 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1976). 
18
 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 81 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5695 
(maintaining the courts’ discretion in awarding various types of injunctions). 
19
 See generally Barr & Wasserman, supra note 5 (stating that the lesson learned from the 
eBay case was that “[patent and copyright] cases should be decided on a case-by-case 
basis.”).   
20
 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006). 
21
 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982). 
22
 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 
(1982)). 
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topic, the Court articulated the generally applicable principle that “a major 
departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly 
implied,” meaning that equity principles should apply across various types 
of cases, regardless of their issues.23  
 
3. COPYRIGHT CASES BEFORE THE EBAY DECISION 
 
[8]  Many courts hinted in opinions preceding eBay that judge-made 
licenses or awards of damages might be better alternatives to permanent 
injunctions in copyright suits.24  Many of these cases espoused the key 
concepts of eBay (that cases should consider traditional equitable 
principles, and outcomes should be determined based on the unique 
factual scenarios in a given instance) before the eBay Court stepped in to 
limit the award of permanent injunctive relief. 
 
A. DERIVATIVE WORKS AND SMALL COMPONENT PARTS 
 
I. ABEND V. MCA, INC. 
 
[9]  Several different cases entail situations where the infringing party 
claimed that its rendition of the copyrighted material was protected under 
the doctrine of fair use25 as a derivative work.  In Abend v. MCA, the 
plaintiff sued MCA over copyright infringement of the idea behind the 
successful movie, Rear Window.26  The Ninth Circuit examined the 
relevance of the infringer’s “fair use” of the copyrighted work (a fictional 
story) in relation to the infringer’s creation of a derivative work in film 
media in deciding whether or not injunctive relief was appropriate.  The 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling found support in Professor Nimmer’s theory that 
“where great public injury would be worked by an injunction, the courts 
might…award damages or a continuing royalty instead of an injunction in 
such special circumstances.”27  The Federal Circuit closely echoed this 
very language in its 2006 decision in eBay by stating that an injunction in 
                                                 
23
 Id. at 1838 (citing Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 320). 
24
 See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
25
 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000), for an articulation of the “fair use doctrine,” which states 
that “fair use of a copyrighted work…for the purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching…scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 
26
 Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988). 
27
 Id. at 1479.  
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patent cases should issue “absent exceptional circumstances.”28  However, 
in the Abend case, the Ninth Circuit did find a special circumstance where 
the award of a permanent injunction would have caused “great injustice 
for the owners of the film,” since such an action would “foreclose 
defendants from enjoying legitimate profits derived from exploitation of 
the ‘new matter’ comprising the derivative work, which is given express 
copyright protection by section 7 of the 1909 Act.”29  In this case, the 
Ninth Circuit denied a permanent injunction based on equitable principles 
and the application of the four-factor test referenced in Weinberger.30  
Though not the exact same situation as that in eBay, one may understand 
the close parallel between an aspect of a derivative work in copyright law 
and the component part of a business method patent31 as requiring similar 
considerations in determining whether or not injunctive relief might be 
appropriate.  Here, the Ninth Circuit determined that statutory damages 
were an adequate remedy and that injunctive relief was not merited under 
a proper analysis of equitable factors.  Though the Abend court did not 
refer specifically to the Weinberger factors, the court underscored the 
importance of the “public interest” factor by stating that an injunction 
could cause “public injury by denying the public the opportunity to view a 
classic film for many years to come.”32  The public good would have been 
disserved by an injunction in this case, so the court decided that an 
alternate remedy was appropriate. 
 
II. DUN V. LUMBERMEN’S CREDIT ASSOCIATION 
 
[10]  Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Association33 demonstrates another 
instance of the “component part concept” in copyright law.  In that case, 
plaintiff Dun discovered the theft of parts of a reference book by 
defendant Lumbermen, a producer of a much larger and more specialized 
                                                 
28
 MercExchange v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
29
 Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479.  But cf. Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 
62, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (declining to consider an infringer’s financial loss as a factor 
militating against an award of a permanent injunction).  
30
 Id. at 1478-81. 
31
 This was the type of patent infringed in eBay.  eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).  
32
 Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988).  
33
 Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20 (1908). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 2 
 
8 
reference collection for the lumber industry.34  Though the Supreme Court 
did not specifically articulate the four considerations of equitable relief,35 
it used several of them (most notably, the “balance of hardships” and the 
“irreparable injury” factors) in its determination that “when we take note 
of the character of the items alleged to be appropriated on the one hand 
and the consequences of granting the injunction prayed for, it would be an 
unwarrantable use of the power of the court to do so.”36 Furthermore, the 
Court explained that “the proportion [of infringement] is so insignificant 
compared with the injury from stopping appellees’ use of their enormous 
volume of independently acquired information, that an injunction would 
be unconscionable.”37  This language insinuates the “balance of interests” 
factor of the equitable considerations and implies the court’s recurrent 
concern with “the public good” in finding that the completeness of a 
reference collection (which would be available to the general public) is of 
primary importance.    
 
[11]  The Court’s holding in Dun conforms with the Constitutional 
doctrine of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science & the useful Arts.”38  
The fourth and chief factor39 under the Weinberger factors is the “public 
interest” factor.  The Supreme Court’s concern in Abend, that “the public 
interest [should] not be disserved by a permanent injunction,”40 resurfaces 
throughout Supreme Court copyright jurisprudence both before and after 
eBay.  Thus, though eBay may appear to have changed the terrain of 
                                                 
34
 Id. at 21. 
35
 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840. 
36
 Dun, 209 U.S. at 22-23. 
37
 Id. at 23. 
38
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
39
 I use “chief factor” only because, in many subsequent and previous Supreme Court 
opinions, the Court’s preoccupation with the “public interest” factor echoes the basic 
intent of the Constitution, which is to disseminate new ideas and inventions to the public.  
The Supreme Court returns to the “public interest” consideration again and again, thus it 
may be inferred that this factor is of primary concern.  See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. 
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he primary purpose of 
copyright is not to reward the author, but to secure the ‘the general benefits derived by 
the public from the labors of authors.’”) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 
127 (1932)); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (stating that “where 
‘there may be a strong public interest in the publication of the secondary work [and] the 
copyright owner’s interest may be adequately protected by an award of damages for 
whatever infringement is found.’”). 
40
 MercExchange v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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copyright jurisprudence, the outcome instead upholds a constant theme of 
serving the public interest, which the 1908 Dun Court clearly enunciated. 
 
B. FILE-SHARING NETWORKS AND DATABASES 
 
I. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. V. REIMERDES (2000) 
 
[12]  In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, motion picture studios 
brought an action against producers of digital copyright-infringing 
software (termed “DeCSS”),41 which facilitated grand-scale decryption of 
copyright-protected movies on digital versatile disks (“DVDs”).42  This 
action arose under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) with 
the motion picture studios requesting injunctive relief in order to stop the 
infringement of their copyrights.43  After the infringer was caught, he 
attempted to thwart injunctive relief efforts by supporting links to other 
websites which enabled the download of his illegal system software (the 
function of this software was to essentially “de-code” digital protection 
shields designed to prevent illegal copying of DVDs).44  Reimerdes 
willfully infringed in this situation, and the court believed that such a 
flagrant disregard for copyright laws merited a permanent injunction.45   
 
[13]  In many instances, willful infringement may be the only 
circumstance still able to revive the “now-extinct” automatic permanent 
injunction post-eBay.  Indeed, the courts do not take situations of willful 
infringement lightly.  In Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the 
Southern District of New York rejected the Defendant’s contention that 
“great public injury” would result from an injunction halting the 
distribution of an unredacted version of its infringing film, 12 Monkeys.46  
Instead, the court instructed: “Copyright infringement can be expensive.  
The Copyright Law does not condone a practice of ‘infringe now, pay 
later.’  Copyright notification and registration put potential infringers on 
notice that they must seek permission to copy a copyrighted work or risk 
                                                 
41
 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(explaining the definition and purpose of DeCSS software). 
42
 Id. at 303. 
43
 Id.  
44
 Id. at 312. 
45
 Id. at 344-45. 
46
 Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62, 65 (1996). 
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the consequences.”47  Many courts both before and after eBay have 
expressed a similar disdain for the willful infringer. 
 
II. N. Y. TIMES V. TASINI 
 
[14]  In N.Y. Times v. Tasini, freelance authors of previously published 
articles filed a claim of copyright infringement against the owners of 
electronic databases that had included the articles within their databases.48  
The Supreme Court decided that it was best for both parties to enter into a 
licensing agreement, rather than to grant the plaintiffs’ claim for 
permanent injunctive relief against the databases.49  The Court stated that 
“it hardly follows from today’s decision that an injunction against the 
inclusion of these Articles in the Databases (much less all freelance 
articles in any databases) must issue.”50  The Court indicated that an 
injunction should not be automatic, but left the ultimate question of 
whether or not a permanent injunction was to be given to the lower 
court.51  Yet, the Court advances what its own course of action might be: 
A compulsory court-made license fashioned for the two parties.52  Though 
this case was decided pre-eBay, its holding draws upon a similar situation 
paralleling the patent case scenario in eBay.  Both cases underscore one of 
the main concerns regarding infringement: a larger infringing company 
may be able to seize individual authors’ and inventors’ copyrights and 
patents without the threat of a permanent injunction.  The public interest in 
having access to a great amount of ideas and copyrightable works 
overrides the interests of the individual author in this context.  Though this 
may seem slightly offensive to authorial rights supporters, the Supreme 
Court’s suggestion reinforces the Constitutional paradigm of furthering 
“Science and the Useful arts.”53 
 
[15]  The decisions in Abend, Dun, Reimerdes, and Tasini discussed 
several different scenarios which might or might not merit permanent 
injunctive relief and the considerations which courts took into account 
                                                 
47
 Id.  
48
 New York Times Co. v. Tasani, 533 U.S. 483, 487 (2001). 
49
 Id. at 505.   
50
 Id.  
51
 Id. at 505-06. 
52
 Id. at 505. 
53
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 2 
 
11 
before the eBay decision.  Understandably, in cases of willful 
infringement, courts have been less likely to deny permanent injunctive 
relief yet are more likely to deny an injunction in cases involving a small 
component of a grander derivative work, such as a motion picture.  This 
circumstance is analogized by the fact pattern in eBay, where a business 
method patent entailed only a small amount of the company’s larger 
money-making product.54  Though eBay involved patent infringement, its 
conclusions of law extend to copyright cases as well. 
 
II.  THE FACTS OF EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE 
 
[16]  In eBay v. MercExchange, the owner of a patent for a business 
method involving online purchases sued an auction website operator for 
patent infringement.55  Petitioner eBay runs an online auction website, 
where buyers and sellers can list and purchase items they wish to sell, 
either through the bidding process or at a fixed price.56  Respondent 
MercExchange held (and continues to hold)57 a valid patent for an online 
purchase method designed to “facilitate the sale of goods between private 
individuals by establishing a central authority to promote trust among 
participants.”58  Ebay and MercExchange entered into negotiations on a 
licensing agreement involving several of MercExchange’s patents, 
including U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (“the ‘265 patent”), which is the 
primary patent at issue in this case.59  However, neither party was able to 
                                                 
54
 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).  
55
 Id.  
56
 Id.  
57
 As of the creation of this note, eBay and MercExchange were still involved in 
proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office concerning the 
validity of the ‘265 patent.  eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839 n.1; see also Linda Greenhouse, 
Justices Order Rethinking of eBay Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at C1.  After the 
case was remanded to the trial court, however, the district court “granted a stay for the 
'051 patent, but denied the '265 patent, due to ‘vastly differing procedural postures.’” 
MercExchange v. eBay Remand—Injunction Denied, Partial Stay Granted, 
http://271patent.blogspot.com/2007/07/mercexchange-v-ebay-remand-injunction.html 
(July 30, 2007, 12:43 EST).   
58
 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839; U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265; see also Linda Greenhouse, 
Justices Order Rethinking of eBay Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at C1.  This feature, 
commonly known as the “Buy It Now” feature, allows an individual to bypass the 
bidding process by placing a direct payment on an item.  For a more detailed description 
of the “Buy It Now” feature, see http://pages.ebay.com/help/newtoebay/glossary.html#B. 
59
 See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839 n.1. 
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reach an agreement.60  Subsequently, MercExchange sued eBay, alleging 
infringement of its ‘265 patent.61  MercExchange requested statutory 
damages and a permanent injunction on eBay’s use of its business method 
patent.62 
 
[17]  MercExchange brought its action requesting statutory damages and a 
permanent injunction under section 283 of the Patent Act.63  That section 
of the Patent Act states that injunctions “may” issue “in accordance with 
the principles of equity,”64 and “courts may grant injunctions … to prevent 
the violation of any right secured by [a] patent, on such terms as the court 
deems reasonable.”65  The trial court found MercExchange’s patent was 
valid, and it had been infringed.66  The trial judge awarded damages to 
MercExchange for eBay’s infringement of the patent but denied 
permanent injunctive relief upon an evaluation of the four-part test used in 
determining injunctive relief.67   
 
[18]  By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that 
injunctive relief should be granted almost by default in all patent 
infringement cases.68  The Federal Circuit invalidated the trial court’s 
rendering of the four-part injunctive relief test on several accounts.  First, 
the Federal Circuit criticized the district court in stating that its “general 
concern regarding business method patents” was not the “type of 
important public need that justifie[d] the unusual step of denying 
injunctive relief.”69 Second, the district court’s concern with continuing 
litigation should not have been a factor influencing its grant or denial of an 
injunction.  Third, the Federal Circuit explained that MercExchange’s 
purported openness to negotiating license agreements should not have 
“deprive[d] it of the right to an injunction to which it would otherwise be 
                                                 
60
 Id. at 1839. 
61
 Id.  
62
 Id.  
63
 Id.  
64
 Id. 
65
 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952). 
66
 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839. 
67
 Id.  
68
 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
69
 Id. 
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entitled.”70  Finally, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the trial court’s 
reasoning that MercExchange’s failure to move for a preliminary 
injunction should “militate against its right to a permanent injunction.”71  
Following this evaluation of the district court’s decision, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that the district court did not properly follow “the 
general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent 
infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”72  In reaction to the 
Federal Circuit’s reiteration of a unique standard in awarding permanent 
injunctive relief in patent suits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.73 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  THE SUPREME COURT’S EBAY DECISION 
 
[19]  In eBay, the Supreme Court determined whether the Federal Circuit’s 
standard of awarding permanent injunctions “by default” in patent suits 
was proper.74  Though the succinct decision handed down by the Court 
was unanimous, a pair of equally concise concurring opinions underlined 
competing theories on how the case at bar—in addition to future cases—
should be handled.  Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, began by 
summarizing broad instructions for the future treatment of permanent 
injunctions across the intellectual property field. 
 
1. JUSTICE THOMAS’S MAJORITY OPINION 
 
[20]  In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Thomas detailed the inherent 
principles within a proper construction of the traditional four-factor test 
used in issuing a permanent injunction in all cases not just patent 
disputes.75  The thrust of his enumeration and application of these four 
factors was to point out to lower courts (and the Federal Circuit in 
particular) that the Patent Act did not create any special exceptions in its 
description of how equitable relief should be given.76  The majority cites 
                                                 
70
 Id.  
71
 Id.  
72
 Id.  
73
 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).  
74
 Id.    
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982)). 
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its purpose in granting certiorari, as a need to determine the 
appropriateness of the Federal Circuit’s “general rule that courts will issue 
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional 
circumstances.”77   
 
[21]  Justice Thomas referenced section 283 of the Patent Act, which 
stated that courts “may” issue permanent injunctive relief in patent cases,78 
in support of the conclusion that the Federal Circuit’s construction of the 
four-factor test for granting injunctions was too broad.79  The majority 
opinion criticized the Federal Circuit for applying too much of a “property 
analysis” when the Patent Act specifically limits the application of 
injunctions by differentiating them from traditional property-related 
concepts.  The Patent Act does state that patents shall have the attributes 
of personal property80 but tempers the statement with the supplementary 
phrase, “subject to the provisions of this title.”81  In its pronouncement that 
“the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for 
violations of that right,”82 the Supreme Court rendered the Federal 
Circuit’s long trail of near-automatic permanent injunction precedents 
virtually erroneous.  
 
[22]  Subsequently, the Court extended this reading of the Patent Act to 
actions arising under the Copyright Act.  The Copyright Act contains the 
same operative language of the Patent Act in its statement that courts 
“may” grant injunctive relief “on such terms as [they] may deem 
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”83  
Throughout the majority opinion, the Court reiterated the importance of 
the “reasonableness factor” within a court’s decision of whether to award 
injunctive relief.84  Indeed, the majority opinion went on to state that it had 
                                                 
77
 Id. at 1839 (citing MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
78
 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952).  
79
 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006). The Supreme 
Court also stated that the district court’s rendering of the Patent Act’s principles under the 
four factors of the Weinberger test was, by contrast, too narrow a construction, and that 
the district court erred in its grant of injunctive relief.  See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841. 
80
 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840. 
81
 Id.  (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1952)). 
82
 Id.  
83
 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1952)).  
84
 Id. at 1839-41. 
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“consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable 
considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows a 
determination that a copyright has been infringed.”85  This part of the 
opinion clearly explicated the holding’s relevance to copyright law and 
reinforced the determination that those courts involved in deciding 
intellectual property disputes must adhere closely to principles of equity in 
all circumstances. 86 
 
[23]  Finally, the majority opinion briefly stated several situations under 
patent law, which would not merit a permanent injunction.  In criticizing 
the district court’s opinion, Justice Thomas pointed out that whether a 
patent holder may be actively utilizing his patent should not bear on a 
court’s decision to award or deny injunctive relief.87  In fact, the Court 
stated that such a conclusion was in tension with its ruling in Continental 
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. “which rejected the contention 
that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to a 
patent holder who has unreasonably declined to use the patent.”88  In 
reaching back to older precedents, the Supreme Court further underlined 
its desire to uphold the standard that traditional principles of equity must 
apply in determining whether or not to award a permanent injunction in 
intellectual property cases.89      
 
2. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS’ CONCURRING OPINION 
 
[24]  Chief Justice John Roberts’ concurring opinion, in which Justices 
Scalia and Ginsburg joined, rested upon an appeal to history in its 
statement that “[f]rom at least the early 19th century, courts have granted 
injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of 
patent cases.”90  Justice Roberts continued in explaining that the historical 
practice of granting equitable relief in patent cases does not automatically 
“entitle a patentee to a permanent injunction or justify a general rule that 
                                                 
85
 Id. at 1840. 
86
 Id. at 1840-41. 
87
 Id. at 1840. 
88
 Id. at 1840-41 (citing Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 
405, 422-30 (1908)). 
89
 Id. at 1841. 
90
 Id. at 1837 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
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such injunctions should issue.”91  Because Justice Roberts’ concurring 
opinion, much like the majority opinion, offered only general advice on 
applying precedent, it is difficult to discern a bright line rule of law from 
his statements.  However, when one reads the combined axioms of 
Roberts’ concurrence as a whole, the opinion seems to suggest that the 
denial of an injunction should be an unusual occurrence in a situation such 
as that of the eBay case.92 
 
3. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRING OPINION 
 
[25]  In Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, in which Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer joined, Justice Kennedy cautioned against a judicial 
methodology which might cling too tightly to historical practices.93  
Justice Kennedy initially lauded the finding of both the majority opinion 
and Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence that an appeal to history offers a 
proper construction of equitable principles.94  However, Justice Kennedy 
also suggested that courts must exercise vigilance in dealing with cases 
which comprise an entirely new fact pattern.95  Though Justice Kennedy 
did not specifically use the words “patent troll” in his analysis, his 
explanation that some permanent injunctions “can be employed as a 
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy 
licenses to practice the patent” clearly alluded to a situation involving a 
patent troll.96  In fact, Justice Kennedy explained that “an industry has 
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and 
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”97 The 
gist of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was to further support the 
majority’s observation that trial courts must exercise discretion in deciding 
whether or not to grant an injunction.  Justice Kennedy, however, offered 
more explicit guidance for lower courts to follow in their awards and 
denials of permanent injunctions than did the majority opinion, while also 
                                                 
91
 Id. 
92
 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Order Rethinking of eBay Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2006, at C1.  This note interprets Chief Justice Roberts’ statements—along with those of 
Justice Kennedy—as applicable across the copyright as well as patent law fields. 
93
 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006).  
94
 See id. 
95
 Id.  
96
 Id.; see also Casagrande, supra note 3, at 12. 
97
 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842. 
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insinuating that a decrease in the availability of permanent injunctive relief 
could have a significant effect on current and future intellectual property 
litigation.98 
 
IV. THE FUTURE EFFECTS OF THE EBAY DECISION 
 
[26]  Immediately following the eBay decision, scholars wondered if 
significant changes might occur.  However, courts were, for the most part, 
uninterrupted in their set system of applying a case-by-case analysis in 
both patent and copyright contexts.  Several cases and policy rationales 
underline the very small change, if any, eBay may have made in the 
intellectual property field.  
 
A. CASE LAW FOLLOWING THE EBAY DECISION 
 
1. PATENT LAW 
 
A. Z4 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. MICROSOFT CORP. 
 
[27]  The z4 Technologies case involved a claim against a software 
manufacturer, which infringed a small component of a larger patented 
software protection scheme.99  In this case, permanent injunctive relief 
was deemed inappropriate as a remedy for Microsoft’s infringement.100  
The district court cited to eBay in construing the four-part test yet found 
that under factors (3) and (4)–the “balancing of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant” factor and “the public interest” factor—permanent 
injunctive relief was inappropriate.101  Even the possibility of computer 
colossus Microsoft shutting down or temporarily canceling its systems 
was enough to dissuade the court from authorizing a permanent 
injunction.102  
                                                 
98
 See Christopher Cotropia, Intellectual Property and Injunctions: The Post-eBay’s 
Environment, at 5 (Mar. 9, 2007) (unpublished article and findings presented to Greater 
Richmond Intellectual Property Law Association) (on file with author).   
99
 z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft, Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006). 
100
 Id. at 444-45. 
101
 Id. at 444. 
102
 Id.  
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[28]  z4 Technologies was a victory for large corporations in the patent 
infringement sphere.103  Holdings such as those in the z4 Technologies 
case show that permanent injunctions are not the standard result of patent 
infringement post-eBay, and though the eBay decision was welcome relief 
for those plagued with the situation of “licensing fee holdups,” the flip 
side of the coin might have spelled doom for small companies, which 
often lack the funding to exercise patents on their own, and operate 
entirely on licensing fees.104  With permanent injunctions no longer a 
standard remedy in fending off true infringement by large companies (and 
not the licensing holdup situation), small companies and individual 
inventors might suffer in the post-eBay patent law environment.105 
 
2. COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
A. DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC. V. DELANE 
 
[29]  In Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Delane, a motion picture studio sued 
an individual who operated a peer-to-peer file-sharing network, which 
facilitated the infringement of the motion picture studio’s copyrights on 
several television shows.106  The district court of Maryland granted Disney 
a permanent injunction in that case barring the infringer from any future 
use of the copyrighted material.107  Before the eBay case, that district had 
routinely entered permanent injunctions once copyright infringement had 
been proven.108  Yet, the Disney court recognized that the traditional four 
factors should now be examined prior to the award of an injunction.109  
The Disney court then applied the four factors, but reached the same 
conclusion as it would have prior to the eBay ruling—that a permanent 
                                                 
103
 See Yixin H. Tang, The Future of Patent Enforcement After eBay v. MercExchange, 
20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 235, 250 (2006) (stating that “[l]arge corporations can afford the 
financial risk of willfully infringing others’ patents.”). 
104See Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, 92 A.B.A.J. 51, 51 (2006) (stating that some 
“trolls” are actually small inventors, truthfully trying to protect their intellectual property 
from infringing corporations). 
105
 See id.  
106
 Disney Enters., Inc. v. Delane, 446 F. Supp. 2d 402, 404 (D. Md. 2006). 
107
 Id. at 408. 
108
 Id. at 407 (citing M.L.E. Music v. Kimble, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472-73 (S.D.W. 
Va. 2000)). 
109
 Id. at 408. 
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injunction was appropriate.110  The opinion explained, under the test, (1) 
that Delane had caused an irreparable injury to Disney Enterprises in his 
willful infringement, (2) that further infringement was a possible threat if 
an injunction was not granted, (3) that Delane had facilitated many other 
possible instances of infringement through his actions, and that (4) there 
was greater benefit to the public in securing the integrity of plaintiff’s 
copyrights than in allowing Delane to make Disney’s copyrighted material 
available to the public.111 
 
[30]  Because Delane purposefully infringed, the penalties within the 
district of Maryland seemed to be harsher,112 thus comporting with proper 
equitable policies.  Disney’s arguments in that case also underlined that 
“digital piracy has a continuing financial impact on the entire motion 
picture industry.”113  Indeed, Disney supported its contentions with a 
declaration from Dean C. Garfield, the Vice-President and Director of 
Legal Affairs Worldwide Anti-Piracy for Motion Picture Association, in 
stating that even Delane’s facilitation of the infringement of ten television 
shows “impacted DVD/home video revenues and rental revenues.”114  
Understandably, the motion picture industry has a huge interest in the 
policy implications of the eBay decision, which might affect copyright 
law. 
 
B.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EBAY DECISION IN BOTH PATENT AND 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
1. PATENT LAW 
 
[31]  The eBay decision purposefully limited the patent troll’s ability to 
excise settlement agreements from large companies “infringing” its 
patent.115  Patent trolls function by attempting to negotiate nuisance 
license fees, which are no more than a type of blackmail an allegedly 
                                                 
110
 Id.  
111
 Id. 
112
 Id. at 406 (citing Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1999), and N.A.S. 
Import Corp. v. Chenson Enters., Inc., 968 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1992) as precedent 
(within the District of Maryland) for supporting harsher penalties for infringers). 
113
 Id. 
114
 Id. at 407. 
115
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“infringing” company pays to the troll for the sole purpose of avoiding 
court.116  Though this situation does exist in today’s business world, the 
big corporation is not always the “innocent infringer,” and the patent troll 
may not always be “the bad guy.”117  In fact, Justice Thomas’s majority 
opinion in eBay cautioned against the complete annihilation of the 
permanent injunction in intellectual property suits, because “some patent 
holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, might 
reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to 
secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market 
themselves.”118   
 
[32]  Some observers fear that the results of the eBay decision will bear 
upon America’s ability to innovate.119  Richard Lang, founder and CEO of 
Burst.com, a company which survives on licensing its patents, foresees 
that a lack of injunctive relief could mean a lack of protection for small 
inventors’ patent rights.120  He worries that “if small inventors go to large 
companies [seeking to partner with them or license their inventions], the 
companies can steal their inventions with impunity.  If small inventors 
create their own businesses [to commercialize their inventions], large 
companies can steal the inventions and put them out of business.”121  The 
impact of the eBay decision in the realm of patent law could mean 
increased lawsuits with increased time periods in order to battle out 
monetary remedies in court, as well as decreased incentives for inventors 
to innovate on their own.122  Either way, “the death of the troll” does not 
necessarily foreshadow a better time for American invention. 
 
2. COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
[33]  When construing the eBay decision against the backdrop of 
copyright law, one must ask what effects such an outcome might have on 
one of copyright’s most affluent fans, the entertainment industry.  There 
are two typical scenarios which copyright holders might face and the eBay 
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118
 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).  
119
 Seidenberg, supra note 104, at 52. 
120
 Id. at 51. 
121
 Id. at 52.  
122
 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 2 
 
21 
decision could impact.  First, a situation arises in which a court interferes 
unnecessarily into business dealings between two parties and declares the 
necessity of a court-mandated license.  This type of compulsory licensing 
existed pre-eBay but may be more prevalent post-eBay.123  Second, the 
decreased availability of permanent injunctive relief might be a boon to 
documentary filmmakers.  The documentary film industry is hyper-alert to 
risk aversion (since an infringing film could mean a major halt in 
production), and eBay’s ruling may decrease the risks associated with 
possible (and often accidental) infringement in that industry, even if only 
to a minimal degree.   
 
[34]  The main point from N.Y. Times v. Tasini,124 a case predating eBay, 
certainly found further support for its earlier ruling in the eBay decision.  
There, the court underlined the availability and importance of licensing 
agreements125 hinting that such options were available and perhaps 
preferable to an award of a permanent injunction.  The ruling propounded 
the “case-by-case” mentality needed in analyzing copyright cases, and 
eBay reinforced that idea again in stating that injunctions should not be the 
presumptive remedy for infringement.126  Though the licensing fee holdup 
situation in eBay will be avoided in circumstances such as these, the court 
will now be serving a function that the marketplace was originally 
designed to handle.  This interference into business relations now carries 
the stamp of judicial authority and could be something that further 
complicates the already-complex issues arising at the negotiation table. 
 
[35]  The film industry’s tendency for risk aversion is pronounced, so 
much so that the general philosophy of many motion picture studios is to 
“license, not litigate.”127  One scholar coined this as the “better safe than 
                                                 
123
 A compulsory license is explained as “not entailing the transfer of copyright 
ownership.”  Further, under a grant of a compulsory license, “at most, the secondary 
work producer receives the equivalent of a nonexclusive license under which it is 
financially liable to the copyright owner.”  Alice Haemmerli, Take It, It’s Mine: Illicit 
Transfers of Copyright By Operation of Law, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1020 
(2006). 
124
 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).   
125
 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.   
126
 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839-40 (2006); see also 
discussion supra Part III.B. 
127
 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 
116 YALE L.J. 882, 890-91 (2007). 
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sued”128 mentality.  Within this paradigm, one of the most vulnerable 
realms of media production is the documentary industry.  Because these 
second-users take so much copyrighted material from everyday culture, it 
becomes especially taxing and expensive for these individuals and 
companies to obtain licenses for every piece of their overall production 
schema.129  For example, a filmmaker shooting a documentary on street 
life in New York City must secure licenses on everything from the song a 
homeless man sings in the background, to a famous landmark appearing 
momentarily across the screen.130  The question then becomes, how might 
eBay affect filmmakers’ hyper-tendencies to seek licensing agreements? 
 
[36]  eBay could potentially be a first step towards curing the licensing 
paranoia currently plaguing the documentary film industry.  eBay’s 
holding that permanent injunctions should not be presumptively automatic 
after a finding of infringement, dictates that courts should be less-inclined 
to award permanent injunctive relief depending on the circumstances of 
the case.131  Given this determination, it seems that one of the judicial 
remedies used “to strike fear into the heart of [potential film media] 
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 Id. at 884. 
129
 Gibson, supra note 127, at 888.  
130
 I am referencing a scenario created within Professor Gibson’s article, cited in footnote 
127, supra.  Professor Gibson explains how concerns regarding already-copyrighted 
material arise post-production when a documentary filmmaker realizes the very large 
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follows:  
In post-production, as the filmmaker edits this clip 
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investors,”132 the permanent injunction, has been somewhat tamed, if only 
in a very theoretical sense.  Though it is unlikely that these types of actors 
will change their behavior significantly, eBay appears to be a step in a 
positive direction for documentary filmmakers, who will have one less 
risk to worry about. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[37]  In the various intellectual property cases decided after eBay, it seems 
that in many instances, the “little guy” (represented by “authorial rights”) 
might suffer.  For instance, in z4 Technologies, the court states that one 
reason why permanent injunctive relief is not appropriate is because “z4 is 
only excluded from selling or licensing its technology to Microsoft.”133  
However, if its activation technology was good enough for Microsoft to 
infringe it, would not Microsoft have been the very entity to whom z4 
would have liked to market its technology?  Of course, the decision in z4 
Technologies to avoid permanent injunctive relief comported with the 
equitable principle that the public would be disserved by a hypothetical 
system-wide shutdown of Microsoft under a permanent injunction.  The 
problem arises in evaluating the greater incentives that larger companies 
might now have to infringe rather than to pay licensing fees to legitimate 
small inventors (not including patent trolls).  In z4 Technologies, there was 
no incentive.  Because a “reasonable royalty” (read: compulsory license) 
would not harshly impact Microsoft, it seems that Microsoft might now 
possess even more ultimate power over smaller companies and might not 
have to answer to the law for possible purposeful infringement in the wake 
of the eBay decision.  Permanent injunctions were at least a viable threat 
to enact deterrence.   
 
[38]  Yet, in copyright cases, eBay does not seem to have changed much.  
Courts in copyright cases were already in the practice of fixing 
compulsory licenses.  The decisions both pre- and post-eBay hinged upon 
proper analysis of the Weinberger factors, though not always specifically 
articulated.  It is also important to note that eBay did not completely wipe 
out permanent injunctive relief—it merely paved the way for the “public 
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interest” to be disserved in more cases than usual if the infringer is a 
corporation like Microsoft, or a large production studio, upon which the 
public is largely dependent for technology, education, or entertainment.  
eBay has probably not altered the law significantly, but at least for now we 
know that patent trolls must go back into hiding, and copyright owners 
must return to the bargaining table—all in the spirit of promoting the 
public good. 
 
